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WOLF! WOLF!-THE RAMIFICATIONS OF FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
JAMES J. DOHERTY
The author is First Assistant Public Defender of Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, and Chief of
its Appellate Division. He has been associated with the Public Defender's Office since 1956.
In his article Mr. Doherty deplores the practice of frivolous appeals and discusses the deleterious
effect upon meritorious cases which warrant the best efforts of appeal counsel and adequate attention
from the reviewing courts.
As a career defender of indigent persons accused
of crime, I find myself in the anomalous and re-
grettable position of criticizing a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States that was in-
tended to benefit the very persons I defend. The
decision is the one rendered in Anders v. California
in May, 1967.1
A 6 to 3 majority of the Court held that court-
appointed appeal counsel does not fulfill his role
as an active advocate in behalf of his client by
writing a no-merit letter to the reviewing court.
The Court established the following guidelines
for the handling of appeals considered frivolous
by appointed counsel:
... if counsel finds his case to be wholly friv-
olous, after a conscientious examination of it,
he should so advise the court and request per-
mission to withdraw. That request must, how-
ever, be accompanied by a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief
should be furnished the indigent and time al-
lowed him to raise any points that he chooses;
the court-not counsel-then proceeds, after
a full examination of all the proceedings, to
decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If
it so finds it may grant counsel's request to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as
federal requirements are concerned or proceed
to a decision on the merits, if state law so re-
1386 U. S. 738 (1967).
quires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the
legal points arguable on their merits (and
therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to deci-
sion, afford the indigent the assistance of
counsel to argue the appeal.
An earlier (1958) Supreme Court decision, Ellis
v. United Statesy had held that appointed appeal
counsel need only ask to withdraw whenever, after
"Cconscientious investigation", he considered the
appeal to be frivolous, after which the court of re-
view would deny the appeal if it was satisfied that
the withdrawing counsel had "diligently investi-
gated the possible grounds of appeal". In Anders
a new dimension was added: counsel who seek to
withdraw must now submit a brief "referring to
anything in the record that might arguably sup-
port the appeal". This places counsel in quixotic
position, as the dissent points out, of trying to find
support for an appeal which he has already con-
cluded to be without any merit whatsoever.
The dissenting opinion noted that California,
the state out of which Anders arose, had earlier de-
veloped a workable, fair system whereby the ap-
pellate court could satisfy itself "from its own re-
view" of the record whether counsel's assessment
of the record was correct. Moreover, the dissent
voiced its concern over the majority's imposition
of "a single inflexible answer to the difficult
problem of how to accord protection to indigent
appellants in each of the 50 States". This latter
2 356 U. S. 674 (1958).
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observation calls for further exploration and em-
bellishment.
Before we can seek to improve our law, we must
attain some fairly clear conviction of what goals
are to be desired. Then the decision of whether a
law is good entails judgment not only on the desir-
ability of its goal but also on its practical working.
Prognosticating whether a legal device will really
work depends on a sane evaluation of each rule
and practice in law. This cannot be done more
than tentatively; it cannot be done by deduction
from prevailing principles. Justice Holmes, in his
lectures entitled, "The Common Law", stated
that "the life of the law has not been logic, it has
been experience".
We are totally unaware of any compelling ex-
perience which would prompt the Court in Anders
to say that the procedure that it commands "will
assure penniless defendants the same rights and
opportunities on appeal-as nearly as is practi-
cable--as are enjoyed by those persons who are
in a similar situation but who are able to afford
the retention of private counsel".
The new procedure will do no such thing. In
fact, it will accomplish an opposite result. The most
startling feature of the Anders decision is that the
people it will hurt the most are those whom it
purports to help-the indigent prisoners. There are
three reasons why the procedure commanded will
hurt indigent appellants: 1) it will encourage me-
diocrity; 2) it will contribute to a backlog of un-
reviewed convictions; and 3) it will impair the
effectiveness of the forma pauperis bar.
THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF MEDIOCRITY
All lawyers should be justifiably proud to play
an active role in the expanding horizons of due
process of law. But their efforts and accomplish-
ments will be hampered, delayed, and discouraged
if they are forced to give formal priority to frivo-
lous appeals. It is naive to expect that counsel
who writes a brief will simultaneously move to
withdraw. The decision invites sophistry; it offers
counsel the choice of filing a schizophrenic motion
to withdraw (accompanied by a formal brief op-
posing the motion), or the alternative of writing
the brief and not moving to withdraw. Human na-
ture will force the selection of the latter alternative.
That will satisfy the form of due process without
regard to substance. Thus, the decision will en-
courage mediocrity or default.
On the other hand, by trusling the forma pau-
peris bar and by challenging it, the Court can call
forth heroic efforts. Almost without exception, the
lawyers in recent landmark cases of substance were
court-appointed. 3
A BACKLOG OF UNREVIEWED CONVICTIONS
With the advent of increased criminal appeals,
the task of briefing and arguing forma pauperis
appeals has been delegated, and will increasingly
be delegated, to tax-supported groups of lawyers
assigned to appeal work exclusively. If such groups
of lawyers are forced to brief frivolous appeals, the
people who will suffer the most are the indigent
prisoners who have been unjustly convicted; they
will languish in prison while the lawyers devote
time and energy to hopeless causes, on a first come-
first served basis.
4
The Appeals Departments of various Public
Defender Offices throughout the country are the
places where backlogs of unreviewed convictions
will first be revealed. Since such offices are notori-
ously understaffed and underpaid, frivolous ap-
peals will compound the evil of delay in reviewing
meritorious appeals. It takes far more time to
write a frivolous appeal than it does to write one
that a lawyer can really sink his teeth in. In the
meantime, the backlogs continue to grow, and
backlogs of unreviewed convictions could produce
situations whereby a convicted person may have
already served his time before his case comes to the
attention of an appellate court.
It is no answer to suggest that the organized bar
of private practitioners could render the needed
relief. That this probably would not happen is il-
lustrated by the experience in Cook County, Illi-
nois, where, in 1930, an unworkable assigned coun-
sel system bad produced such a backlog of criminal
cases on the trial docket that it became necessary
to create the office of Public Defender.
It makes no difference whether a log-jam is at
the mouth of the river or at the outlet. Assuming
that the large law firms briefed and filed all the
appeals in the Public Defender's backlog within
30 days, it would simply move the log-jam into the
State's Attorney's office. If that office received
sufficient outside help to cope with the inundation
of appeals, it would simply move the log-jam into
the reviewing courts.
3 For example, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S.
333 (1963).
4 A first come-first served basis is the only fair method
of handling appeals assigned to a public agency.
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FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
The place to attack any evil is in its cause. One
of the causes of growing backlogs of unreviewed
convictions is the frivolous appeal.
IMPAIR3NT OF H E EFFEcT VENEss OF
Tm FoRuA PAuPERiS BAR
Every lawyer who undertakes the appeal of a
law suit has a duty to his client to win if at all pos-
ible. He also has a duty to his profession, the re-
viewing court, the law, justice, and above all to
himself, to make sure that if he does prevail it is
indeed by honorable means. He has not only the
right but the duty to vigorously and fearlessly
champion the most unpopular cause, but he should
not urge a frivolous position or undertake an appeal
on a gamble that the reviewing court will err in
his favor. The lawyer who does the latter will lose
stature which may extend beyond the particular
case; he will find himself in the position of the
shepherd boy who cried, "Wolf, wolf!" when there
was no wolf. The reviewing court will not know
when he is sincere.
Candor, fairness and sincerity are every lawyer's
responsibility to every court in which he appears.
He does not have to be right, but he has to believe
he is right. And the court has to believe that he be-
lieves he is right. Anything short of that is intel-
lectual dishonesty.
The statement in Anders that the procedure
commanded "will assure penniless defendants the
same rights and opportunities on appeal--as nearly
as is practicable--as are enjoyed by those persons
who are in a similar situation but are able to afford
the retention of private counsel", is predicated
upon the inarticulated and false premise that pri-
vate lawyers will undertake the appeal of any crim-
inal conviction, even a frivolous one, so long as
they are compensated. With deference and respect
for the Court, I cannot subscribe to such an un-
warranted denigration of the Bar.
Under the standards of ethical conduct pre-
scribed in the Canons of Professional Ethics, a
private lawyer who is approached to under-
take a criminal appeal should charge a reasonable
fee to make a preliminary study of the record.5 If
he decides that the contemplated appeal is without
merit, he should so advise the client and decline to
undertake the appeal. Under those same standards,
a court appointed counsel on appeal who consci-
entiously arrives at the conclusion that an appeal
is frivolous-that there are no grounds of appeal-
should be premitted to withdraw upon the filing of
an affidavit which recites the facts (with record
reference) and his opinion that the appeal is with-
out merit.
In the Third Book of Moses, called Leviticus, we
find the following at Chapter 19, verse 15:
Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment:
thou shalt not respect the person of the poor,
nor honour the person of the mighty: but in
righteousness shalt thou judge thy neigh-
bor.
From this authority it is respectfully submitted
that an indigent prisoner is entitled to counsel on
appeal as much as an affluent prisoner, but not
more.
Any client is entitled to the very best that a law-
yer has to offer; his skill, his knowledge, his experi-
ence, and his diligence. But no one has the right to
make an intellectual prostitute out of a lawyer.
A lawyer's time and advice are for sale. His in-
tegrity is not for sale. And it should not be given
away.
CONCLUSION
When viewed realistically, undue solicitude for
indigent prisoners who have been proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt in a fair trial is a denial
of equal protection to those indigents who have not
been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or
who have not received a fair trial, because of delay
in reviewing their convictions.
For the benefit of indigent prisoners who have
been unjustly convicted, the frivolous appeal
should not be permitted to consume the time of
appeal lawyers and reviewing courts.
-See Canons 5, 12, 15, 22, 30, 31, and 44.
